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Future- oriented mental time travel (FMTT) consists in a set of neurocognitive 
functions that enable one to break free of the grasp of the perpetual “now” and 
consider how things might be in the “next.” The adaptive functionality of such 
a mental competence is immense: to be capable of anticipating, imagining, and 
responding to contingencies that cannot be known with certainty— but whose 
consequences have fundamental significance for survival— provides an enor-
mous selective advantage. While organisms vary greatly in the complexity and 
temporal reach of their ability to consider the future (e.g., Cheke & Clayton, 
2010; Klein, 2013a; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), all living things possessed of 
motility and reasonably sophisticated neural function must, of adaptive neces-
sity, be able to orient toward and react to personally relevant possibilities (Klein, 
2013a). Indeed, several investigators have proposed that an organism’s ability 
to anticipate and plan for the future is a major driving force of cortical evolu-
tion (e.g., Bar, 2011; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Pezzulo, 2008; 
Tulving, 2005).
Psychologists have long held an interest in various aspects of anticipatory behav-
ior. It was not until the first stirrings of the “cognitive revolution” in the 1950s, 
however, that serious and sustained attention to FMTT became a regular feature 
of research agendas. This now has developed into a thriving industry, with several 
hundred papers devoted to FMTT appearing in just the past 15 years.
While tremendous progress in our understanding of FMTT has been attained, 
these gains primarily have been in the explication of the behavioral characteristics, 
neuroanatomical correlates, and phylogenetic precursors of the human ability to 
orient toward the future. Considerably less attention has been devoted to the pro-
cesses that enable a person to mentally navigate a nonexistent world of possibility. 
What, specifically, is future- oriented subjective temporality?
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Although subjective temporality has long been a focus of philosophical and psy-
chological investigation (for reviews, see Arstila & Lloyd, 2014; Roeckelein, 2000), 
it seldom has been addressed in the context of FMTT (there are, of course, excep-
tions; e.g., Dalla Barba, 2002; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 2005). 
We conjecture that this lack of attention is, in part, a consequence of the assump-
tion that FMTT is an act of memory and imagination— and, since psychologists 
have trained their investigative skills on these faculties for much of the discipline’s 
history, wherein lies the motivation to reinvent the “wheels” of memory and 
imagination?
1.  GOALS OF THE CHAPTER
In this chapter we focus on the human ability to subjectively orient toward the 
future. First, however, a few words are required about the role of imagination in 
mental time travel (memory’s role will be treated in section 3). FMTT experi-
ence typically entails some form of imagination (e.g., counterfactual, scenario 
construction, simulation, etc.). But to experience FMTT, imagination must be 
acted on by processes that enable temporal awareness— and it is those processes, 
not the imaginative act per se, that allow us to mentally project occurrent imagi-
nation from the “now” to the “next” (e.g., one can imagine a camping trip with-
out situating those imaginings in any temporal context; Klein, Robertson, & 
Delton, 2010). In short, our capacity to move the mind through landscapes yet 
to be actualized is not, and cannot, be achieved solely via an act of imagina-
tion:  absent additional processes, no imaginative movement through time is 
possible. These processes— which we refer to as subjective temporality— are the 
focus of this chapter.
For much of its existence as a topic of investigative effort, FMTT has been 
accorded the status of a reasonably well- circumscribed set of neurocognitive abili-
ties. Despite surface variation due to the task employed, the mechanisms under-
lying FMTT are assumed to share a strong family resemblance (based largely on 
their supposed grounding in episodic memory; see section 2 and Klein, in press). 
However, when examined through an analytic lens, it becomes clear that the total-
ity of phenomena labeled FMTT is more akin to a complex fractal set than a well- 
formed taxonomy. This, in turn, suggests that if we are going to understand FMTT 
we must be cognizant that it comes in different forms or types: one size does not fit 
all (for a recent review, see Klein, 2013a).
To anticipate our conclusions, we argue that although there is a marked ten-
dency to treat FMTT as a unitary mental faculty that, despite task- driven outward 
variation, ultimately reduces to a common phenomenological state (underwrit-
ten primarily by episodic memory), FMTT is neither unitary nor is it neces-
sarily beholden to episodic memory (on this latter point, see also Abraham & 
Bubic, 2015; Irish, Chapter 19 of this volume; Irish & Piguet, 2013; and Klein, 
2103a). Rather, FMTT is diverse both in its experiential realizations and causal 
dependencies.1 It is our contention that the phenomenological diversity found 
with FMTT is dependent not on the type of memory in play (e.g., episodic versus 
semantic), but on the type of subjective temporality associated with a particular 
memorial state (Klein, in press).
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2.  A BRIEF REVIEW OF THOUGHT ABOUT  
SUBJECTIVE TEMPORALIT Y AND MEMORY
Western interest in subjective temporality begins with ancient Greek philosophy.2 
Hesiod, in his Theogony (circa 700 b.c.), observes that a function of memory is to 
enable its possessor to subjectively transcend the stasis of the present. While he was 
not entirely clear whether temporal navigation was directionally biased (i.e., toward 
past or future), Aristotle (384 BC— 322 b.c. was adamant: “The object of memory 
is the past” (cited in Sorabji, 1972, 13). The future, in contrast, is known not by 
memory but by acts of anticipation.
Aristotle’s position dominated discourse on the relation between time and mem-
ory for almost two thousand years. Thus, Augustine (354– 430 a.d.) contends, “The 
time of present things past is memory, the time of present things present is direct 
experience and the time of present things future is expectation” (Confessions, Book 11, 
 chapter 20, heading 26). Although the concept of memory underwent a number of 
(often minor) changes (mostly in the hands of Scholastic authorities; e.g., Danziger, 
2008; Yates, 1966), its relation to the past served as the stable ground for virtually 
all discourse.
It was not until the late nineteenth century that the idea that the subjective tem-
porality enabled by memory is restricted to navigating one’s past met serious chal-
lenge. Dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian view was stimulated by Darwin’s work 
on natural selection. For example, Bradley (1887), adopting a functional perspec-
tive, argued that memory must, of adaptive necessity, be oriented toward the future. 
“Why,” he asked,
is our memory directed towards our incoming sensations and towards the 
[temporal] side from which change comes? … The answer, in a word, is prac-
tical necessity. … Life being a process of decay and of continual repair and 
struggle throughout against dangers, our thoughts, if we care to live, must 
mainly go the way of anticipation. We are concerned practically with what 
meets us and what we go to meet, and this practical concern has formed the 
main habit of our thought.” (Bradley, 1887, 581– 582; word in brackets added 
for textual clarification).
For much of the next century, treatment of the relation between memory and 
future- oriented temporal perspective remained largely in the hands of philoso-
phers, while academic psychology continued to devote attention to the intuitively 
more appealing notion that memory is concerned with things past (thereby com-
mitting the logical error of assuming that since memory is from the past it must be 
about the past; e.g., Klein, 2013b, 2015).
2.1.  The Emergence of FMTT and Its Relation to Memory
Psychology’s interest in subjective temporality has been on display from the time 
the discipline first achieved academic independence (around the middle of the 
nineteenth century; for a review, see Fraisse, 1963). However, little of this work 
was devoted to explication of the role of memory in future orientation:  to the 
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extent that memory was partnered with subjective temporality, the questions asked 
were largely psychometric— for example, the role of memory in retrospective esti-
mates of elapsed time, just noticeable differences between temporal intervals, and 
so on (e.g., Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Nichols, 1891; Ornstein, 1969; for a review, see 
Roeckelein, 2000).
Sustained interest in FMTT first appeared in the 1950s, as psychologists began to 
consider how thought about, or orientation toward, the future influences behavior 
(for reviews, see Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Gorman & Wessman, 1977). These initial 
forays examined a diversity of topics— such as the part played by future orientation 
on life- span development (Klineberg, 1967; Wohlford, 1966), delinquent behavior 
(Davids, Kidder, & Reich, 1962), emotions (Melges & Fougerousse, 1968), impulse 
control (Klineberg, 1968; Rozek, Wessman, & Gorman, 1977; Siegman, 1961), moti-
vation (Nuttin, 1985), academic achievement (Teahan, 1958), and mental illness 
(Krauss & Ruiz, 1967; Wallace, 1956). Most of this work treated future- oriented 
thought as a variable that people might use or be influenced by:  the cognitive 
and neural underpinnings (e.g., memory) of FMTT seldom figured in discussion 
(this most likely was due to hard- line positivism’s informal ban on “black- box” 
psychology).
Following a brief period of benign neglect, psychological investigation of sub-
jective temporality was reinvigorated by three conceptual meditations— Tulving 
(1985), Ingvar (1985), and Suddendorf (1994). However, the questions addressed 
had changed:  influenced by the theoretical commitments of the cognitive revo-
lution, inquiry now was trained on the relation between future- oriented thought 
and its memorial underpinnings. The first few empirical treatments soon fol-
lowed (e.g., Dalla Barba, Cappelletti, Signorini, & Denes, 1997; Klein, Loftus, & 
Kihlstrom, 2002; Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose & MacLeod, 1996), and in less 
than two decades the relation between memory and FMTT had grown into a thriv-
ing research industry. This interest shows no sign of abating— as evidenced by the 
increasing pace and broadening scope of the questions being asked, as well as spe-
cial issues (e.g., Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, in press), symposia 
(e.g., Society for Personality and Social Psychology [SPSP], 2015) and edited books 
(e.g., the present volume) devoted to the topic.
3.  MEMORY, SUBJECTIVE TEMPORALIT Y, AND FMT T
Although Bradley’s prophetic observations waited nearly 100 years before receiv-
ing serious attention, by the mid- 1980s psychologists had begun to consider what 
(given the intellectual climate) seemed a radical possibility— that the evolved func-
tion of memory was to focus thought and behavior on the future, rather than on 
the past (for reviews, see Boyer, 2009; Klein, 2013b; Tulving, 2005). Within this 
framework, one particular type of long- term memory— episodic— was accorded 
special status as the neurocognitive basis of virtually all forms of FMTT (for recent 
reviews, see Addis & Schacter, 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013; Klein, 2013a; Schacter, 
Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Szpunar, 2010).
The assumed bond between episodic memory and FMTT was widely accepted, 
and scholarly treatments of the pairing— impressive both in quantity and 
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diversity— soon covered the academic landscape. Terms such as episodic future 
thought (Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) episodic simulation/ construction (Addis, Cheng, 
Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008), episodic self- projection (e.g., 
Buckner & Carroll, 2007), and episodic foresight (e.g., Atance & Sommerville, 2014; 
Suddendorf, 2010) became the “coin of the realm.”
One possible reason for the tight focus on episodic memory is that— with two 
notable exceptions (Attance & O’Neill, 2001; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002)— 
initial theory and research had examined only the effects of episodic memory on 
FMTT (Dalla Barba et  al., 1997; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1985; 
Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Williams et  al., 1996). However, both logical 
concerns and empirical demonstrations recently have called into question both 
the exclusivity and conceptual warrant of the assumed relation between episodic 
memory and FMTT (these are treated extensively in Klein, in press, and will not be 
elaborated here).
3.1.  Broadening the Scope of Memory’s Participation in FMTT
In what follows, we focus on the question of whether episodic memory is neces-
sary for FMTT. As our brief review in the previous section suggests, this was, 
and continues to be, the “received view.” However, in the first years of the new 
millennium, Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom (2002) demonstrated that semantic 
memory can support certain forms of FMTT in the absence of any functioning 
episodic memory. Specifically, as a result of an anoxic episode brought on by 
cardiac arrest, patient D. B.  suffered a total loss of episodic memory. In con-
trast, his semantic knowledge largely was preserved (for case details, see Klein, 
Rozendal, & Cosmides, 2002). As anticipated from previous studies on the 
effects of episodic amnesia on FMTT (e.g., Dalla Barba et al., 1997), D. B. was 
unable to mentally project himself into the future. He could, however, imagine 
non- personal future scenarios.
Although this finding— that FMTT might be based on intact semantic 
knowledge— initially was ignored, investigators began to take notice as they 
encountered increasing difficulty fitting their FMTT findings to an exclusively 
episodic model (e.g., Addis & Schacter, 2012; Anderson, 2012; Cooper,Vargha- 
Khadem, Gadian, & Maguire, 2011; Irish, Chapter  19 of this volume; Maguire, 
Vargha- Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010). For example, patients with episodic amne-
sia due to hippocampal abnormalities sometimes retain the ability to imagine 
future experiences (e.g., Maguire et  al., 2010; Mullally, Hassabis, & Maguire, 
2012). Explanations adhering to the tenets of the episodic model suggested that 
these patients possibly possessed residual hippocampal function capable of under-
writing future projection (e.g., Mullally et al., 2012). However, the findings also 
were consistent with the possibility that semantic knowledge, in the absence of 
episodic function, can sustain FMTT. It thus remained a live question whether 
semantic knowledge by itself, or in interaction with partially intact episodic mem-
ory (inferred from residual hippocampal activity), accounted for future- oriented 
imagination reported by these investigators.
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Empirical support for the position that FMTT cannot be grounded solely in the 
offerings of episodic memory recently has been demonstrated by several labs. For 
example, Irish, Addis, Hodges, and Piguet (2012) showed that individuals suffer-
ing semantic dementia (with corresponding impairment of semantic memory) have 
difficulty constructing novel future scenarios despite largely intact episodic func-
tion. The authors concluded that semantic memory is a necessary component of 
future- oriented thought. Echoing these results, Duval, Desgranges, de La Sayette, 
Belliard, Eustache, and Piolino (2012) demonstrated that patients in early to mod-
erate stages of semantic dementia experience significant impairment in future- 
oriented self- projection, regardless of whether the task performed was designed to 
access semantic or episodic memory. Taken together, these findings (and others like 
them; e.g., Costi, Navarro, Vallat- Azouvi, Brami, Azouvi, & Piolino, 2015) suggest 
that episodic memory is not sufficient for (at least certain forms of) FMTT.
It may not be necessary either (again, at least for certain forms of FMTT; e.g., Klein, 
in press). Consider the case of patient J.  R. (Manning, Denkova, & Unterberger, 
2012). Following surgical treatment for temporal lobe epilepsy, J. R. showed pre-
served episodic memory alongside selective loss of semantic function. Unlike the 
dementia patients studied by Duval et al. (2012), J. R. was able to recall his personal 
past and imagine a personal future. However, his ability to engage in mental time 
travel of an impersonal nature was seriously impaired in both temporal directions 
from the present. This finding, in combination with that of patient D. B., suggests a 
double dissociation between types of memory (episodic/ semantic) and the ability to 
imagine types of future- oriented scenarios (personal/ non- personal).
One particularly interesting case is that of patient R. B. (e.g., Klein & Nichols, 
2012). Following a serious head injury, R.  B.  suffered a very unusual memory 
impairment: while he remained able to retrieve content typically associated with 
episodic memory (i.e., temporally, spatially, and self- referentially propertied), and 
was able to experience autonoetic consciousness (see section 3.3), he could not con-
join the two. Absent a linkage between retrieved content and autonoetic conscious-
ness, no episodic memory is possible (e.g., Tulving, 1985, 1993; Wheeler, Stuss, & 
Tulving, 1997).
Yet despite his absence of episodic recollection he was able to form plans of a 
personal nature (surprisingly, he could form new episodic memories, i.e., postdat-
ing his injury; but this meager corpus— he was tested approximately 2– 4 months 
post- injury— could not possibly provide a database sufficient for making plans, 
some of which were complex and temporally extensive). This case calls into 
question whether episodic memory is necessary for all forms of personal FMTT. 
Perhaps autonoetic consciousness, absent episodic recollection, is sufficient for self- 
referential FMTT (an explanation favored by Klein, in press)? Perhaps retrieved 
mental content, unaccompanied by recollective experience (e.g., Klein, 2015), can 
enable (at least certain kinds of) personal planning? Unfortunately, this is not the 
place for extended discussion of this fascinating case, which would take us far afield 
(as well as exceed our chapter’s word limits).
Studies performed with mnemonically healthy individuals also have begun to 
question the sustainability of a purely episodic model of FMTT. For example, it has 
been shown that the ability to construct future- oriented simulations of novel events 
requires contributions from both episodic and semantic memory (Anderson, 2012; 
Irish, Chapter 19 of this volume). Along similar lines, work by D’Argembeau, Lardi, 
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and Van der Linden (2012) and D’Argembeau and Mathy (2011) demonstrates that 
thinking about oneself in the future draws on resources from episodic and seman-
tic memory.
In short, findings, mostly of recent vintage, pose a serious challenge to the explan-
atory adequacy of the episodic model of FMTT (for recent reviews, see Addis & 
Schacter, 2012; Irish, Chapter 19 of this volume; Irish & Piquet, 2013; Klein, 2013a, 
in press).
3.2.  From Memory to Subjective Temporality
For present purposes, a central, but often overlooked, implication of the findings 
reported in section 3.1 is not that different types of memory are involved in FMTT. 
This no longer is in question. Rather, it is what these differential contributions tell 
us about the types of subjective temporality underwriting FMTT experience. The 
demonstration that FMTT is associated with semantic as well as episodic memory, 
taken in conjunction with the assumption that unique forms of subjectivity accom-
pany different forms of memory (e.g., Tulving, 1985, 1993), led Klein and his col-
leagues (Klein, 2013a; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002)  to propose that FMTT 
cannot adequately be captured by a single type of temporal subjectivity: rather, the 
kind of subjective temporality enabling FMTT varies as a function of the type of 
memory called into play by task demands.
Moreover, as Klein (in press) has argued, it is the subjective temporality asso-
ciated with memorial experience, not the memorial experience per se, that plays 
the foundational role in enabling mental time travel. Tasks that rely on episodic 
memory for their successful realization promote a form of subjective temporality 
that allows a person to project him- or herself into the future. Importantly, this 
entails the feeling that one is pre- experiencing the anticipated outcome. Klein and 
colleagues termed this “lived time.” For example, if, when asked to imagine what 
you will watch on television tonight, you do so by recollecting information about 
what you have watched on this day of the week in the past, your temporal subjectiv-
ity will be the type that accompanies episodic memory (i.e., “lived time”). The phe-
nomenology of “lived time” is pre- reflective— that is, past experience, when acted 
on by this form of temporal experience, results in a directly given, non- inferential 
feeling that the self is pre- living a future possibility (see Klein, in press). “Lived 
time” does not require additional considerations or deliberations to justify one’s 
feeling that occurrent mental content points to future contingency.
In contrast, tasks that draw on semantic knowledge (e.g., when asked to antic-
ipate environmental challenges likely to face the planet in the next decade, you 
formulate an answer by retrieving and reviewing what you know about ecological 
dangers looming on the horizon) are associated with impersonal forms of temporal 
experience. Klein and colleagues called this form of temporality “known time.” 
Unlike “lived time,” the phenomenology of “known time” is neither pre- reflective 
nor experienced as a pre- living. Rather, it is knowledge of impersonal possibili-
ties that emerges from conceptual analyses performed on content available to con-
sciousness. (Note that Klein, 2013a, argues that “known time” can, in principle, be 
self- referential. But the phenomenology is such that the self is treated as an object of 
conceptual analysis, rather than as first- person subjectivity.) For example, a person 
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may infer from subsequent analysis that retrieved content refers, by logical impli-
cation, to the future (e.g., “I know town hall meetings are on Mondays— though 
I no longer recollect the circumstances in which I acquired this knowledge. Since 
today is Saturday, the meeting is in two days”). Thus, “known time” consists in 
the conceptual analysis of temporal features embedded in retrieved content, rather 
than the unmediated feeling (perhaps, but not necessarily, grounded in retrieved 
content; see section 3.5) that one is pre- experiencing a personal future.3
In sum, the difference between “lived” and “known” temporal experience resides 
in the phenomenology that each enables. In the former case, subjective temporality 
is directly given as part of one’s occurrent mental state, whereas in the latter, subjec-
tive temporality is the product of inferential or interpretive acts (for more for exten-
sive discussion, see Klein, 2013c, 2014a; in press). Further, in “lived time” temporal 
experience is felt as a pre- living; in contrast, the temporal experience enabled by 
“known time” is analytic, the outcome of inferential processing of chronologically 
relevant information. The take- away message is that if we hope to fully appreciate 
FMTT, we need to recognize that subjective temporality is not a single, undifferen-
tiated phenomenon. Rather, there are different types of subjective temporality with 
different causal bases and phenomenological character.4,5
3.3.  A Comparison of “Lived” and “Known” Time with Tulving’s 
Distinction Between Autonoetic and Noetic Consciousness
“Lived time” maps reasonably well onto Tulving’s (1985, 2005) proposal that epi-
sodic recollection entails a form of consciousness that he termed autonoetic (at 
least the future- oriented aspect of autonoesis; see note 5). According to Tulving, a 
person is autonoetically conscious when she “is capable of becoming aware of her 
own past as well as her own future; she is capable of mental time travel, roaming 
at will over what has happened as readily as over what might happen, indepen-
dently of physical laws that govern the universe” (Tulving, 1985, 5). Autonoetic 
consciousness thus enables a person to relive earlier experiences as well as pre- live 
future possibilities (for related views, see Gardiner, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997; Szpunar, 2010; Wheeler et al., 1997). Importantly, the temporal subjectivity 
made possible by autonoesis is directly given to awareness, rather than being based 
on inference or interpretation (e.g., Klein, 2013c; Markowitsch, 2003; Tulving, 
2005). Hence, autonoeisis, like “lived time,” is possible without, or apart from, 
conceptual analysis.
It is important to note that the adoption of episodic memory as the foundation 
of FMTT derives, at least in part, from an uncritical acceptance of a temporal sym-
metry between past- and future- oriented forms of autonoesis (e.g., Klein, 2013a; 
Merker, 2007; Perrin, Chapter  3 of this volume). Specifically, it is (often tacitly) 
assumed that past- oriented autonoetic consciousness is ontologically and phe-
nomenologically isomorphic with future- oriented autonoesis, thereby sanctioning 
extension of the functional scope of the recollective act to “what is yet to be” as 
well as to “what once was” (for critique and discussion see Klein, 2013a; Perrin, 
Chapter 3 of this volume).
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However, as a philosophers have argued, the phenomenological and causal 
natures of past and future (at least with respect to the everyday world of experien-
tial reality; in the realms of special relativity [e.g., Hoffmann, 1998] and quantum 
reality [e.g., Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935], questions of temporality become 
deeply puzzling) are notably asymmetric (e.g., Faye, 1989; Lockwood, 2005; 
McLure, 2005; Perrin, Chapter 3 of this volume). For example, while the accu-
racy of one’s recollections can sensibly (though imperfectly; e.g., Von Leyden, 
1961) be assessed by comparison with evidence (physical and mental) of a once 
existent past, there are no comparable criteria to guide assessment of the accuracy 
of future- oriented imagination. This follows directly from the definition of the 
future as “a mixture of coexisting latent possibilities as yet unresolved” (Merker, 
2007, 326). All we can know is that “all possible futures, except one, will in fact not 
materialize, but not which one” (Merker, 2007, 326; emphases in original).
Of course, revisiting the past in anticipation of the future is not necessarily an act 
of imaginative futility. Past knowledge, conjoined with the experientially defensible 
assumption that natural laws ensure a level of uniformity in outcome, sanctions 
the reasonable expectation that one’s pronouncements about uncertain, yet- to- exist 
eventualities will have some empirical warrant. But, unlike the past, knowledge of 
whether one’s anticipatory beliefs are veridical remains evidentially opaque until 
“possibility” becomes “reality.” The stubborn fact is that— as a consequence of both 
epistemological and ontological asymmetries— any simple acceptance of a past/ 
future isomorphism is logically and phenomenologically problematic (for discus-
sion in the context of mental time travel, see Klein, 2013a; Merker, 2007; Perrin, 
Chapter 3 of this volume). In this regard, Klein (2013a, in press) has called for the 
need to distinguish past- and future- oriented autonoetic consciousness in discus-
sion of FMTT (see also Perrin, Chapter 3 of this volume).
In contrast to “lived time,” “known time” has no clear correlate in Tulving’s tax-
onomy. Tulving maintained that the semantic memory is accompanied by noetic 
consciousness. Noesis “allows an organism to be aware of, and to cognitively oper-
ate on, objects and events, and relations among objects and events, in the absence 
of these objects and events” (Tulving, 1985, 3). However, unlike autonoesis, noetic 
experience takes place absent a sense of past or future (e.g., Tulving, 1993; Szpunar, 
2010). Put simply, the objects of noetic consciousness are firmly situated in the 
“here and now.”6 Though “lived time” appears isomorphic with future- oriented 
auotonesis, “known time” has no obvious theoretical correlate in Tulving’s (or 
Dalla Barba’s; see note 6) system.
Thus, while the “lived” versus “known” conceptualization can account for both 
episodic- and semantic- based FMTT, the autonoetic versus noetic distinction 
(as currently configured) struggles to make sense of semantic forms of FMTT. 
In fact, Tulving and colleagues reject the possibility of any temporal experience 
accompanying semantic memory (e.g., Tulving, 1985; Szpunar, 2010). These defi-
nitional constraints on what constitutes temporal experience, however, can be 
loosened. By allowing that noetic consciousness can promote a form of temporal 
subjectivity based on conceptual analysis (i.e., “known time”), the construct can 
be modified to accommodate the type of subjective temporality associated with 
semantic- based FMTT.
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3.4.  “Lived” and Known” Time in Relation  
to Philosophical Conceptions of Time
The “multiple subjective temporality” postulate conforms nicely with a well- known 
distinction between types of temporality that traces to antiquity (e.g., Mooij, 2005; 
in the modern era this conceptualization most closely is associated with the work 
of McTaggart, 1908). The distinction trades on the difference between temporal 
experience conceived as (a) the constant flow from future to present to past, with 
temporal designators continually changing ontological status (i.e., that which once 
was future becomes present and that which is present will, with time’s flow, recede 
further into the past), and (b) a fixed, “earlier- later” chronology in which tempo-
ral placement of events is invariant (e.g., October 9, 1952 is, and always will be, 
prior to October 9, 1953): time is frozen into an unchanging pattern of “before and 
after” (McTaggart, 1908; Papa- Grimadli, 1998; Rochelle, 1998). These two modes 
of temporal conceptualization— which McTaggart refers to as the A- and B- series, 
respectively— are not logically reducible, one to the other (e.g., Loizou, 1986; 
McTaggart, 1908; for an opposing view, see Cornish, 2011).
Like “lived time,” the subjective temporality afforded by the A- series is pre- 
reflective. As McLure (2005) comments, apprehension of temporal flow is directly 
given to consciousness: “the ‘eye’ that espies the flow is within it, not behind it” (49). 
The B- series, in contrast, consists in a conceptual analysis of the events and hap-
penings in terms of their chronological arrangement. It thus comports with the 
subjective temporality associated with “known time.”
It is important to mention that persons deprived of their feeling of “lived time” 
(e.g., due to neural dysfunction) still can know about the temporal constituents of 
the A- series. For example, patients K. C. and D. B., both of whom suffered com-
plete loss of episodic memory accompanied by an inability to experience temporal 
flow (a review of these cases can be found in Klein, 2014b; Klein & Gangi, 2010), 
remained fully able to construct grammatically sound propositions using the tem-
poral designations of past, present, and future (that is, they conceptualized the 
A- series in terms of “known” rather than “lived” time).
Consider the following conversations with K. C. and D. B. (reported in Klein, 
2014b). In response to the question “What is the future?” K. C. replies, “Events 
that haven’t happened yet,” while the question “What is the past?” is answered, 
“Events that have already happened.” Asked “Can you change the past?” 
K. C. emphatically states, “No!” When queried “Can you change the future, and 
if so, how?” he observes, “Yes. By doing different things.” To the question “Can 
something that happens in the future change what has happened in the past?” 
K. C. again responds with an unequivocal “No,” while the query “If an event is 
in the future will it always stay in the future?” elicits the response “No. Because 
time moves on.”
Patient D. B. also presents a nuanced understanding of temporality. In response to 
the question “What is the future?” he answers, “Things that haven’t happened yet.” 
He describes the past as “Things that happened before … but are not happening 
now.” Asked, “Can you change the past, D. B. says, “Don’t think so, unless you had 
a time machine or something. Don’t think so … not really. Maybe in science fiction 
(laughs).” To the question “Can the past influence the present?” he replies, “Sure … 
that’s the way things work.”
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In short, both patients know about the flow of time, despite being unable to expe-
rience temporal movement as part of their subjective reality. The future exists for 
K. C. and D. B., but not as the experienced flow of the now to the next. It is known 
but not felt.
3.5.  Beyond Memory
Our focus has been on the type of subjective temporalities afforded by different kinds 
of memory. But new work suggests that we need to enlarge our conceptual net if we 
hope to capture the neurocognitive complexity of FMTT. For example, Zeithamova, 
Schlichting, and Preston (2012) have shown that other cognitive systems (e.g., per-
ceptual) in addition to memory are involved in the ability to plan for future contin-
gencies. Similar sentiments are voiced by de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, Barone, 
Amboni, and Della Salla (2012), who argue that executive function plays a crucial role 
in Parkinson’s patients’ performance on future thinking tasks. Arzy, Collette, Ionata, 
Fornari, and Blanke (2009) have shown that brain areas associated with mental imag-
ery must be taken into account for some forms of FMTT. These data are telling us that 
a full appreciation of FMTT requires that we recognize that neurocognitive mecha-
nisms other than memory (and the subjective temporalities they entail) play an impor-
tant role in our ability to orient toward the future (for discussion, see Klein, 2013a).
Recent research also suggests that certain forms of temporal self- projection may 
not rely on memory at all. For example, Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, Gao, Black, 
and Rosenbaum (2015; see also Kwan, Craver, Green Myerson, Boyer, & Rosenbaum, 
2012) assert that memory impairment does not impact a patient’s ability to make 
choices about future rewards (a task that seems to rely on decision rules rather than 
retrieved content). As another example, personal diachronicity (i.e., the sense that 
one is a temporal continuant) appears, at least in some of its manifestations, to be 
based on non- evidential feeling of continuity, rather than on factually or rationally 
based analyses (e.g., Klein, 2014b). Moreover, it seems perfectly reasonable to muse 
about one’s future absent any grounding in considerations of the past (e.g., “I won-
der what tomorrow will be like?”).
While one might argue that these examples can be explained by positing that 
choice, personal diachronicity, and future- directed musings are mnemonically 
guided, this requires that one embrace all of these acts as species of memory. At 
this point, we maintain, the designation memory becomes so encompassing that 
it no longer is clear what the term picks out (for fuller discussion, see Klein, 2015). 
As Moyal- Sharrock (2009) observes, even allowing that most of our cognitive abili-
ties involved memory at some stage in their development, and that this is taken as 
grounds for seeing them as the products of memory, “this is trivial ground … it is 
no more than to say that memory has played a role in their achievement, not that it 
continues to do so in their subsequent deployment [e.g., choice behavior or sense of 
self as a temporal continuant]” (226; text within brackets added for clarification).
In our view, the examples presented (a) highlight the multifaceted nature of the 
FMTT, and (b) suggest that we may need to enlarge our inventory of “forms of tem-
poral subjectivity” (in this regard it is interesting to note that McTaggart discussed 
temporalities other than those captured by the A- and B- series). While some of the 
preceding examples might be accommodated by mnemonic processes (and their 
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temporal accompaniments— though it is unclear how this would work in the case 
of felt diachronicity), to do so we have to expand the scope of the term memory to 
such a degree that it threatens to undermine its conceptual utility (for discussion, 
see Klein, 2015; Moyal- Sharrock, 2009).
4.  CONCLUSIONS
Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom’s (2002) proposed relation between types of memory 
and types of subjective temporality can be seen as a useful corrective to the (typi-
cally tacit) assumption that there is a single, unitary form of temporal experience. 
While it may be the case that the distinction they proposed ultimately will prove 
too limited to fully capture the richness of FMTT experience (see section 3.5), it is 
a step in the right— and, we believe, necessary— direction. What is not in doubt is 
that we need to be more analytically precise and nuanced about what it is we refer 
to when we use the label FMTT (e.g., Klein, 2013a, in press). Is it our ability to con-
struct personal future scenarios, to construct public future scenarios, to plan for 
future contingencies, to anticipate events, to maintain our sense of personal con-
tinuity, to make future- oriented judgments, muse about future contingencies, to 
predict our future feelings, attitudes, and beliefs? Are these simply manifestations 
of superficial variations of a common underlying mental faculty— an inevitable, but 
theoretically uninteresting, consequence of using different tasks to probe a unitary 
ability to orient toward and imagine the future? Or do these variants rely— at least 
in part— on different neurocognitive mechanisms?
In this chapter we champion the latter possibility. Specifically, we argue that, in 
the absence of a more sophisticated understanding of the theoretical entailments 
of FMTT, the term runs a serious risk of becoming a “catch- all” phrase that diverts 
attention from different forms of subjective temporality— each with distinctive (as 
well as overlapping) neurocognitive and conceptual commitments— that enable 
FMTT in its various manifestations.
In summary, there are reasons (both empirical and conceptual) to suspect that 
no single form of future- oriented temporal subjectivity is sufficient to capture the 
complexity of FMTT experience. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the idea that 
subjective temporality can be partitioned into subtypes remains, at present, an 
assertion in need of investigative and theoretical attention. For instance, while avail-
able evidence suggests that “lived time” is self- referential whereas “known time” is 
not (e.g., Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002), this assertion rests on the outcome of 
studies that did not orthogonally vary types of subjective temporality (“lived” ver-
sus “known”) and self- referential processing (present versus absent). A necessary 
step toward understanding personal variants of mental time travel (into the past as 
well as the future) requires experimentally separating “lived” and “known” forms 
of temporality (perhaps by manipulating the type of memorial experience required 
for task performance) and examining their respective contributions to FMTT.
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NOTES
 1. This concern is not novel. For example, the first author has been voicing these 
concerns— to relatively little effect— since 2002. Others have as well (e.g., Addis & 
Schacter, 2012; Szpunar, 2010). However, discussion often (though not always; e.g., 
Suddendorf, 2010)  has appeared piecemeal, surrounded by discussion of other 
issues. It is our hope that by placing our concerns in bold relief (i.e., providing 
them their own chapter), we might reduce the signal- to- noise ratio that inevitably 
attends embedding a topic within additional topics.
 2. The study of subjective temporality found in Eastern wisdom traditions typi-
cally is less analytic than those in Western philosophical treatment. One 
reason for this is that discussion, where it exists, often is the byproduct of 
concern with other topics such as the question of past lives (Griffiths, 1992). 
That being said, a recent analysis of Buddhist texts reveals that certain writ-
ings (e.g., Vasubandhu’s theory of mind) show striking similarities to Western 
thought concerning the role of the subjective time associated in acts of mem-
ory (Chadha, 2014).
 3. There is no reason that conceptual analyses could not be performed on the offer-
ings of episodic memory. And there likely are occasions on which they are. The 
point simply is that such analyses need not be undertaken in order for the indi-
vidual to experience subjective temporality with this form of memory. In contrast, 
conceptual analyses are a necessary accompaniment for subjective temporality to 
emerge in the context of semantic knowledge.
 4. It is, of course, possible to know about “lived time” without directly experiencing 
it. As will be shown in section 3.4, individuals can subject the idea of temporal flow 
to a purely conceptual analysis (i.e., “known time”). In fact, as reported in Klein 
(2014b), patients suffering complete failure of episodic memory retain preserved 
knowledge of the concepts of past and future. But, in virtue of their disability, they 
are incapable of experiencing temporal movement (i.e., “lived time”).
 5. In this chapter we restrict analysis of subjective temporality to its future orien-
tation. While past- oriented temporality has many of the features described for 
its future- oriented brethren, there are profound logical and causal asymmetries 
between the two (see section 3.3). Accordingly, a simple extension of future- 
oriented temporal subjectivity to experience of the past is difficult to justify. We 
plan to discuss the nature of past- oriented temporal subjectivity at a later time (see 
also Perrin, Chapter 3 of this volume).
 6. Work by Dalla Barba and colleagues (reviewed in Dalla Barba, 2002) on the 
relation between memory and temporal experience has a clear resemblance 
to Tulving’s ideas on the topic. Like Tulving, Dalla Barba proposes that two 
modes of consciousness can accompany the retrieval of memory content— 
temporal consciousness (TC) and knowing consciousness (KC). TC, like 
autonoesis, is consciousness of time— it enables a person to become aware 
of something as part of his or her personal past, present, or future. KC, by 
contrast, operates like noetic consciousness— it enables a person to become 
aware of something as an element of knowledge without that knowledge being 
situated in a temporal framework. Note: An updated version of the conceptual 
entailments of TC and KC can be found in Chapter 6 by Dalla Barba in the 
present volume.
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